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Abstract
Data stewards seeking to provide access to large-scale social science data face a difficult
challenge. They have to share data in ways that protect privacy and confidentiality, are in-
formative for many analyses and purposes, and are relatively straightforward to use by data
analysts. One approach suggested in the literature is that data stewards generate and release
synthetic data, i.e., data simulated from statistical models, while also providing users access to
a verification server that allows them to assess the quality of inferences from the synthetic data.
We present an application of the synthetic data plus verification server approach to longitudinal
data on employees of the U. S. federal government. As part of the application, we present a
novel model for generating synthetic career trajectories, as well as strategies for generating high
dimensional, longitudinal synthetic datasets. We also present novel verification algorithms for
regression coefficients that satisfy differential privacy. We illustrate the integrated use of syn-
thetic data plus verification via analysis of differentials in pay by race. The integrated system
performs as intended, allowing users to explore the synthetic data for potential pay differentials
and learn through verifications which findings in the synthetic data hold up and which do not.
The analysis on the confidential data reveals pay differentials across races not documented in
published studies.
Key Words: Disclosure, Privacy, Public, Remote, Synthetic.
1 Introduction
Widespread access to large-scale social science datasets greatly enhances the work of evidence-
based policy makers, social scientists, and statisticians. Yet, widespread dissemination of large
scale social science data also carries a significant social cost: it puts data subjects’ privacy and
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confidentiality at risk. Simply stripping unique identifiers like names and exact addresses, while
necessary, generally does not suffice to protect confidentiality. As is well documented (e.g., Sweeney,
1997, 2015; Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008; Parry, 2011), ill-intentioned users may be able to
link records in the released data to records in external files by matching on variables common to
both sources. These threats are particularly serious for large-scale social science data. Such data
often come from administrative or privately collected sources so that, by definition, someone other
than the organization charged with sharing the data knows the identities and (a large number of)
attributes of data subjects. Large-scale social science data also typically include many variables
that, since the data arguably are known by others, could serve as matching variables.
As the size, richness, and quality of social science data have increased, so too have the threats
to confidentiality. Confronted with these risks, responsible data stewards face a difficult dilemma:
how can they provide access to confidential social science data while protecting confidentiality
of data subjects’ identities and sensitive attributes? Often data stewards—whether in academia,
government, or industry—default to restricting access to carefully vetted and approved researchers
via licensing arrangements or physical data enclaves. This is only a partial solution. It denies the
benefits of data access to broad subsets of society including, for example, students who need data
for learning the skills of data analysis and citizen scientists seeking to understand their society.
One approach that has been suggested in the literature (e.g., Karr and Reiter, 2014) to deal
with this dilemma is for data stewards to use an integrated system comprising three components,
namely (i) a fully synthetic dataset (Rubin, 1993) intended for wide access, (ii) a verification server
(Reiter et al., 2009) that allows users to assess the quality of inferences from the synthetic data,
and (iii) means for approved users to access the confidential data, such as by secure remote access
or a physical enclave. We review the rationale for this approach in Section 2. As far as we are
aware, however, no one has implemented or illustrated this type of integrated system for complex
data typically used in social science research.
In this article, we present an application of synthesis with verification on longitudinal data
comprising the workforce of the United States federal government from 1988 to 2011. Specifically,
we generate an entirely synthetic federal workforce using administrative data from the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM). The dimensionality and longitudinal structure present many com-
plications for synthetic data generation; indeed, part of the contribution of this article is to describe
strategies for generating synthetic datasets with such complexity. Among these strategies is a new
Bayesian model for generating career trajectories. We also include assessments of the analytic va-
lidity of and potential disclosure risks in the synthetic data. To illustrate the benefits and usage of
verification servers, we estimate regression models with the synthetic data that assess systematic
differences in employee salaries by race and gender, and we investigate how such differences change
over time. We verify the results using novel verification measures that we design to satisfy differ-
ential privacy (Dwork, 2006). We empirically evaluate the performance of the new differentially
private measures, illustrating when to expect them to yield analytically useful results and when
not to do so. Finally, we validate the regression results using the confidential data.
The findings are remarkable for both methodological and substantive reasons. For the former,
the integrated system performs as advertised, allowing us to see the validity, and shortcomings,
of the synthetic data results. For the latter, the confidential data suggest that, given our model
specification, (i) the differential in pay for white and black female employees has been increasing
over time, and that (ii) Asian male employees make substantially less on average than white male
employees over much of the time frame we analyzed. As far as we know, neither of these findings
have been previously documented in the public sector at this magnitude or detail.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the general
framework of providing synthetic data with verification via an integrated system. In Section 3, we
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describe the OPM data in more detail and outline the procedures used to generate the synthetic
data, including the new Bayesian model for generating synthetic careers. In Section 4, we describe
the novel differentially private verification measures. In Section 5, we mimic a usage of the inte-
grated system to analyze the differential pay gap: we start with the synthetic data, verify findings
using the differentially private measures, and repeat the analysis on the confidential data. Although
the big picture concepts underlying this integrated system have been highlighted previously (Cal-
lier, 2015; Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking, 2017, p. 57), this analysis represents the
first illustration of the full framework on genuine data. The substantive analysis itself is notable,
as we are unaware of any recent, public studies by the federal government on racial disparities in
pay. The relative decrease in gains by black women and the relatively stagnant differential between
white and black men suggest limited recent progress toward pay equality for these groups. Finally,
in Section 6, we discuss implementation issues for these kinds of integrated systems and suggest
topics for future research.
2 The Framework: Synthesis with Verification
We use a framework that integrates three key ideas from the literature on confidentiality protection
and data access. The first idea is to provide synthetic public use files, as proposed by Rubin (1993)
and others (e.g., Little, 1993; Fienberg, 1994; Raghunathan et al., 2003; Reiter and Raghunathan,
2007; Drechsler, 2011). Such files comprise individual records with every value replaced with sim-
ulated draws from an estimate of the multivariate distribution of the confidential data. When
generated appropriately, synthetic data can preserve many, but certainly not all, important asso-
ciations in the confidential data. They also should carry low risks of re-identification disclosures,
since the released data do not correspond to actual records. This largely eliminates the kinds of
record linkage attacks that have broken typical disclosure control methods, as it is nonsensical for
ill-intentioned users to match synthetic records to external files.
While synthetic data have been used to release public use versions of several high profile social
science datasets (Abowd et al., 2006; Hawala, 2008; Machanavajjhala et al., 2008; Drechsler et al.,
2008; Kinney et al., 2011), at present they have a critical weakness. Users of synthetic data cannot
determine how much their analysis results have been impacted by the synthesis process if all they
have are the synthetic data. This limitation leads to the second idea that is integrated in the
framework: provide users access to verification servers (Reiter et al., 2009). A verification server is
a query-based system that (i) receives from the user a statistical query that enables comparison of
results from the synthetic and confidential data, and (ii) returns an answer to the query without
allowing the user to view the confidential data directly (Karr and Reiter, 2014). With the output
from a verification server, users can decide whether or not results based on the synthetic data
are of satisfactory quality for their particular purposes. Crucially, however, verifications also leak
information about the confidential data. Thus, we should apply some form of disclosure limitation
to the verification measures, ideally one that enables the data steward to bound the information
leakage. This is precisely what differential privacy promises, which motivates us to develop the new
verification measures presented in Section 4.
Undoubtedly, some analyses will not be adequately preserved by the synthetic data. The verifi-
cation server will help users learn this, thereby reducing the chances of false findings based on the
synthetic data. These users may desire access to the confidential data, which motivates the third
prong of the integrated data access system: provide remote access to confidential data to approved
users via virtual machines on a protected research data network (PRDN). Variants of PRDNs are
in use by many organizations, including national statistical agencies, universities, and the National
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Opinion Research Center. Thus, we do not describe how to set up the architecture for a PRDN
in this article, although we use one at Duke University (https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.03317) to
validate results in the OPM application.
Integrating all three ideas in a single system creates synergies. Data stewards can establish
policies with low barriers for access to the synthetic data, for example, by allowing users to access
the synthetic data without completing an extensive approval process. Users can start with the
synthetic data to investigate distributions and relationships, determine what questions might be
answerable with the data (e.g., are there enough cases of interest to support accurate modeling?),
examine the need for transformations and recoded variables, and develop appropriate code. The
verification server can enable users to know when to trust and act on their results, and when
perhaps not to do so. Even users who are not satisfied with the quality of the results can benefit
from starting with the synthetic data. Storage and processing of large-scale data are costly to data
stewards, who likely will pass some costs to users. Users who have an informed analysis plan—for
example, they know the approximate marginal distributions of the data and have a sense of the data
structure—can improve their efficiency when using the PRDN, thereby saving their own time and
money. By performing their data explorations outside the PRDN, these analysts will use up fewer
cycles on the protected systems and open opportunities for more efficient use of those systems.
3 Description of Data
3.1 Overview of the confidential data
The Office of Personnel Management maintains the personnel records for all civil servants in the
United States. We work with a subset of the data from the OPM’s Central Personnel Data File
(CPDF) and Enterprise Human Resources Integration system (EHRI), which we jointly refer to as
the Status File (SF). The SF we use is a snapshot of the civil service on every September 30 (the end
of the fiscal year), comprising approximately two million employees per year from 1988 to 2011. For
each employee, the file includes annual data on characteristics like age, agency, education level, pay
grade, occupation, supervisory status, entry and departure, and other background characteristics.
The data are longitudinally linked. We exclude employees from the armed services, the Department
of Defense, the U. S. Postal Service, and individuals who work in classified roles, sensitive agencies,
and sensitive occupations as defined by OPM. The final analysis file includes personnel records
from 3,511,824 employees.
The OPM data are valuable because they allow researchers to investigate many key questions
in the study of human capital in large organizations and government organizations in particular.
For example, researchers can use the OPM data to examine government agencies’ ability to recruit
high quality individual talent, to develop their employees’ expertise within those agencies, and to
retain the best and brightest in government service (e.g., Lewis and Durst, 1995; Bolton and de
Figueiredo, 2016). These are important and complicated challenges; public agencies must cope
with episodic turnover of political appointees, limited ability to adjust worker compensation in
response to outside market pressures, difficulty in performance measurement due to the nature of
governmental tasks, and constraints on frictionless alterations to the government workforce because
of employment terms for civil servants (Borjas, 1980; Bolton et al., 2016). Ultimately, research with
these data can shed light on the relative costs and benefits of human capital management strategies.
The OPM data also are used by the government as a major input for wage comparisons, tracking
personnel, determining workforce diversity, and helping to construct personnel policies for the over
two million civil servants.
As of this writing, the OPM has made several derivatives of the SF data available to the
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public, although not the full SF data that we work with. In particular, the OPM releases summary
data online as “data cubes.” These comprise quarterly tabular summaries of a limited set of
variables without employee indicators that would allow for over-time comparisons. Pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the OPM provides non-anonymized data for six variables—
name, agency, location, position, grade, and salary—for each civil service employee in a non-
sensitive position to anyone who requests them. Some proprietary websites, such as FedSmith, also
make some or all of these limited data available to the public. The news agency BuzzFeed used a
FOIA request to obtain and subsequently release a subset of the OPM data. Unlike our SF data,
the data released by BuzzFeed do not include race or gender, which typically are not included by
the OPM in FOIA requests, nor 14 other variables that we synthesize.
We obtained the SF data through an agreement with OPM, with the understanding that we
would not reveal personally identifiable information when using the data, especially information
that OPM deems sensitive like race and gender. The OPM data files are currently housed in a
PRDN at Duke University with strict access and confidentiality standards under a Duke University
IRB-approved protocol. We did extensive work cleaning and preparing these data for research
purposes, in accordance with the OPM’s “Guide to Data Standards (Part A).” The supplemental
material in Barrientos et al. (2018a) includes more details on our data preparation processes.
The availability of the limited data, as well as now the BuzzFeed data and possibly future releases
from FOIA requests, pose an obvious disclosure risk problem. If the SF data were “anonymized”
by standard techniques employed by government agencies—e.g., stripping names coupled with
aggregating or perturbing a small fraction of the data values—an ill-intentioned user might be able
to reverse engineer a large percentage of the OPM database by matching the six or more known
fields to the same fields in the anonymized data. They subsequently could retrieve the private and
confidential data of a large percentage of the federal personnel.
3.2 Overview of synthetic data creation
To reduce these disclosure risks, the OPM could release a fully synthetic version of the SF. In this
section, we provide an overview of our process for generating the synthetic SF data. We focus on
the methods for generating synthetic careers, races, and wages; these variables are central to our
illustrative verification analysis of wage differentials. The synthesis models for other variables are
described in Barrientos et al. (2018a). As of this writing, the OPM has not yet determined whether
or not to make the synthetic data available to a broader set of researchers.
The SF data are complicated, making the task of generating useful synthetic data challenging.
The employees are measured on 29 variables over the course of 24 years. They work across 607
agencies, some of which have only a handful of employees and some of which have thousands of
employees. The variables are mostly nominal with levels ranging from 2 (sex) to 803 (occupation),
and also include a small number of numerical variables. For any employee, most variables can change
annually, although a few demographic variables remain constant or change deterministically (age).
Many pairs of variables have theoretically impossible combinations, such as certain occupations
being restricted to certain education and degree types. Some variables should be non-decreasing
over time, such as months of military service and educational levels, although the confidential data
have records that violate those restrictions, presumably due to reporting errors.
To make the synthetic data, we construct a joint distribution using sequential conditional mod-
eling, as done in Kinney et al. (2011). This allows us to develop models targeted to different types
of variables, to conveniently incorporate logical relationships among the variables, and to develop
efficient, parallelizable code. We order the variables from the first to last to be synthesized. Let
Vij be the value of the j-th ordered variable for the i-th employee, where j = 1, . . . , 29. We seek
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the joint distribution,
p(Vi1, . . . ,Vi29) = p1(Vi1)× p2(Vi2|Vi1)× . . .× p29(Vi29|Vi1, . . . ,Vi28), (1)
where each pj denotes the conditional distribution of Vj given V1, . . . ,Vj−1. We let V1 correspond
to the sequence of agencies where the employee has worked, which defines the employee’s career.
Nearly all other variables depend on when and where the employee works, so modeling this variable
first facilitates the synthesis process. We let (V2, . . . ,V7) be, in order, gender, race, educational
level, age in years, years since the employee earned the degree mentioned in educational level,
and an indicator for ever having served in the military. These demographic variables are, for the
most part, straightforward to model because either (1) they remain constant across time or change
in a deterministic manner after the initial year, or (2) change with only low probabilities. We let
(V8, . . . ,V29) include the remaining variables, which depend on the characteristics of the employee’s
job that year. Examples of these variables include occupation, part-time or full-time status, grade
and step classification, supervisory status, and pay. A full list of variables is in Barrientos et al.
(2018a).
For Vj that can change annually, where j > 1, we generally apply lag-one modeling strategies
to simplify computation. Specifically, let Vijt be the j-th variable at year t for the i-th employee.
Let ti1 < . . . < tini be the ni years when employee i has values (is working), and set Vij =
(Vijti1 , . . . , Vijtini ). For longitudinal Vj , we use the conditional representation,
pj
(
Vij |Vi1, . . . ,Vi(j−1)
)
=
ni∏
l=2
pjtil
(
Vijtil
∣∣Vi1, . . . ,Vi(j−1), Vijti1 , . . . , Vijtil−1 ) , (2)
where pjtil denotes the distribution of Vijtil conditioned on the previous j − 1 variables and the
values of Vij up to time til−1. We assume that
pjtil
(
Vijtil
∣∣Vi1, . . . ,Vi(j−1), Vijti1 , . . . , Vijtil−1 ) = pjtil (Vijtil ∣∣Vi1til , . . . , Vi(j−1)til , Vijtil−1 ) . (3)
Thus, the conditional distribution of Vijtil depends only on current values of Vij′ , 1 < j
′ < j − 1,
and the nearest past value of Vij .
For purposes of this article, we create and analyze one synthetic dataset. If desired by the OPM,
we could create and release multiple synthetic datasets by repeating the data generation process.
An advantage of releasing multiple synthetic datasets is that users can propagate uncertainty from
the synthesis process through their inferences using simple combining rules (Raghunathan et al.,
2003; Reiter and Raghunathan, 2007; Drechsler, 2011).
3.2.1 Modeling strategy for employees’ careers (V1)
We define an employee’s career as the sequence of agencies where the employee has worked through-
out the 24 years. Since most employees have not worked in all 24 years, we create an additional
“agency” corresponding to the status of not working. With this additional level, all employees’
sequences have length 24.
To model these sequences, we create three additional variables. Let G be the number of agencies
where the employee has worked over the 24 years. Let Z be the list of years in which the employee
moved to a new agency, including a change in working status. Let W be the ordered sequence of
unique agencies where the employee has worked. The values of (G,Z,W) completely describe the
entire career of any employee, as illustrated in Table 1.
Defining a model for employees’ careers is equivalent to defining a model for (G,Z,W), which
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Employee Employee’s career G Z W
e1 0 0 A A 0 0 C C C C 3 (3,5,7) (0,A,0,C)
e2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 B 2 10 (0,B)
e3 A 0 B C C A A A 0 0 4 (2,3,4,6,9) (A,0,B,C,A,0)
Table 1: Illustration of how to define (G,Z,W) using three hypothetical employees and 10 years.
Each column in the employee’s career represents a year; a 0 means the employee did not work that
year; and, A, B, and C represent three different agencies. For example, employee e1 did not work
in years 1 and 2, worked in agency A for two years, stopped working in years 5 and 6, and worked
in agency C during the last four years.
we do sequentially. For G, we use a discrete distribution on {1, . . . , 24} with probabilities equal to
the observed frequencies of each value, from which we randomly generate the values of G associated
with the synthetic employees. For Z|G, we create a one-to-one function TG to map Z into a space
of permutations dependent on G. We model TG(Z)|G using a latent model defined on the simplex
space. The latent model is defined using mixtures of Dirichlet distributions. This model allows us
to borrow information across different agency patterns (given G) and, therefore, to give positive
probability to unobserved values of Z|G. Since we use a one-to-one mapping, the model for TG(Z)|G
can be easily used to generate values from Z|G. Finally, we model W|Z, G using a Markov chain
of order one. A formal description of the three sub-models is in Barrientos et al. (2018a). While
targeted at modeling careers, this model can be applied more generally for other sequences of
categorical variables.
3.2.2 General strategy for race (V3)
Almost all employees report the same value of race in all 24 years. However, 2.7% of employees
report different values across the years, usually changing values only once or twice. It is possible
that these represent clerical errors in the data, but it is also the case that OPM changed the
ways that they handled the collection of race data during the period covered by our dataset. In
particular, different categories were available for employee selection at different points from 1988
to 2011, and eventually OPM allowed individuals to select more than one race. There is no way for
us to distinguish clerical errors from instances in which employees changed their race identification
for personal reasons or because of how the data were collected.
Rather than model longitudinal changes in race across time for all employees, which easily
could result in far more switching than observed in the data, we instead create an auxiliary binary
variable that indicates whether the values of race remain the same across all years or not. Using
the confidential data, we estimate a model for this binary outcome with classification and regres-
sion trees (CART), conditioning on sex (V2) and predictors derived from the employee’s career
(V1). CART models are useful as synthetic data engines, as they can reflect important features of
conditional distributions automatically and flexibly. Following the approach in Reiter (2005b), we
run the synthetic values of (V1,V2) down the fitted tree to generate synthetic values of the binary
variables for each synthetic employee. For synthetic employees whose generated binary variable
indicates that their race value does not change, we predict their race using a CART-based model
estimated from the confidential data. This model uses the first observed race as the outcome vari-
able and (V1,V2) as predictors. Finally, for synthetic employees whose binary variable indicates
that their race values change across time, we model the race at each year using (2) and (3), using
CART for each p3,t where t = 1, . . . , 24.
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3.2.3 General strategy for wages (V27)
Federal employees’ basic pay (salary before any location adjustments) is set by tables known as pay
plans. For example, most government employees in white collar occupations fall under the General
Schedule pay plan. For most pay plans, basic pay is a deterministic function of a combination
of variables, usually including the employee’s grade and step. Thus, in theory, you can find any
federal employee’s pay by locating their grade and step on their pay plan table. However, in the
SF, some employees’ basic pay is not consistent with their pay plan, grade, and step; when this
happens, usually the pay coincides with a value in the pay table associated with a neighboring step.
To capture these features, we synthesize pay plan, grade, and step before basic pay, thereby
allowing us to “look up” the pay for the synthetic employees. We model basic pay using (2) and
(3) with a CART synthesizer, assuming that basic pay is a nominal variable. This essentially is
equivalent to sampling from the values of basic pay reported in grade and step for a given pay plan,
but also allowing for other variables on the file to explain deviations from the pay plan.
3.2.4 Evaluations of analytic validity
We evaluate the analytic validity of the synthetic OPM data using the general approach for synthetic
data products currently published by federal statistical agencies. First, we consult subject matter
experts and staff at the OPM to determine a set of analyses that is representative of likely uses
of the synthetic data. The subject matter experts suggested estimands involving race and gender,
which are not available for individual employees on public use files, as well as analyses involving
longitudinal trends. The staff at the OPM suggested estimands that can be obtained from the
data cubes, as they believe users will have more faith in the synthetic data if those are faithfully
reproduced. Second, after selecting the analyses, we run them on the synthetic and confidential
data within the PRDN. We compare the results, identifying features of the joint distribution that
are modeled accurately and not as accurately as desired. This process is iterative, in that we use
the results to refine and improve the synthesis models.
With a dataset of this complexity and dimensionality, the number of potentially interesting
analytical validity checks is enormous. We summarize an extensive, but necessarily partial, set of
results from these checks in Barrientos et al. (2018b) and at https://github.com/DukeSynthProj/
DukeSyntheticDataResources. In these results we include analyses of pay differentials by race for
sub-populations of the OPM file, including specific agencies and occupations. Of course, with a
dataset of this complexity and dimensionality, it is practically impossible to preserve all relationships
when synthesizing. This underscores the benefits of verification servers for synthetic data products.
3.2.5 Evaluations of disclosure risks
For this synthetic OPM file, we do not evaluate the risks that intruders can use the synthetic data to
learn whether or not particular individuals are in the confidential OPM database. The confidential
OPM database is a census, so that all federal employees (in the agencies we include) are known to
be in the database. Further, as mentioned in Section 3.1, various non-anonymized data products
derived from the confidential OPM data are publicly available. Hence, intruders seeking to learn
whether or not certain individuals are in the OPM database have far more informative—indeed,
perfectly informative—sources to use than the synthetic OPM data. Instead, we focus on the risk
that intruders can use the synthetic OPM data to infer values of individual employees’ sensitive
variables that are not in the public data products, like gender and race.
To assess these inferential disclosure risks, we compute probabilities that intruders correctly
guess individuals’ sensitive values given the synthetic data. Here, we describe an approach for as-
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sessing inferential disclosure risks for employees’ most recently reported races. Broadly, we identify
combinations of variables known to be publicly available, namely the six fields released as non-
anonymized data by OPM and the 14 variables in the BuzzFeed data, that are present in both the
synthetic and confidential OPM files. For each of these combinations, we compute the percentage
of times each race category appears in the synthetic data. We record the numbers of individuals for
whom the percentage corresponding to their actual race exceeds a threshold deemed too high risk
(thresholds are determined by policies of the data steward). Details of the methodology appear in
Barrientos et al. (2018a).
Revealing the thresholds and the exact numbers of individuals exceeding them could result
in increased disclosure risks for some records. Hence, as typical when reporting disclosure risks
in applications with genuine sensitive data (e.g., Holan et al., 2010), we do not publish precise
estimates of the probabilities. We can say, however, that less than 15% of employees’ true races
can be guessed correctly by using this attack strategy. Whether or not this is an acceptable risk is,
of course, a matter for the data steward (OPM) to decide.
When considering such probabilities, it is also important for data stewards to compare against
relevant baseline risks. For example, suppose that anyone can learn the marginal distribution of
race for particular agencies in particular years from public sources. Suppose further that this
public information reveals that all employees in a certain agency report the same race in one year
(which happens for some small agencies). In this scenario, synthetic data with this same marginal
distribution do not reveal any new information about these employees’ races. Arguably, this should
not be counted as a disclosure risk attributable to the synthetic data. In fact, the data cubes
published by OPM include tables of marginal distributions of race by agency, as well as margins
of race by other variables. Hence, we can treat the marginal distributions of race from the cubes
as baseline risks. Doing so, we find that more than half of the races correctly estimated in the
synthetic data also can be determined using just the marginal information from the data cubes.
We also find that, across all employees in one particular year, the probabilities for the synthetic
OPM data are lower than those for the data cubes for about 50% of employees, and higher for
about 15% of employees. Again, whether or not this is an acceptable incremental disclosure risk is
a policy decision for the data steward rather than the statisticians who assess the risk.
Assessing inferential disclosure risks for high-dimensional, fully synthetic data is a computation-
ally intensive and challenging task, and is the subject of ongoing research. For additional discussion,
see Reiter (2005a), Abowd and Vilhuber (2008), Drechsler (2011), Wang and Reiter (2012), Reiter
et al. (2014), and McClure and Reiter (2016), as well as the applications cited in Section 2. Section
6 includes additional discussion of disclosure risks in the integrated system.
4 Verification Measures
The quality of inferences from synthetic data depend entirely on the quality of the models used to
generate the data, as the synthetic data only can reflect distributional assumptions in the synthesis
models (Reiter, 2005a). Analysts of the synthetic data need some way to assess the accuracy of
their particular inferences based on the synthetic data. Verification servers provide an automated
means to provide such feedback.
In designing a verification server, the agency must account for a crucial fact: verification mea-
sures leak information about the confidential data (Reiter et al., 2009; McClure and Reiter, 2012).
Clever data snoopers could submit queries that, perhaps in combination with other information,
allow them to estimate confidential values too accurately. To reduce these risks, one approach is to
require verification measures to satisfy -differential privacy (-DP), which we now explain briefly.
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Let A be an algorithm that takes as input a database D and outputs some quantity o, i.e.,
A(D) = o. In our context, these outputs are used to form verification measures. Define neighboring
databases, D and D′, as databases of the same size that differ in one row and are identical for all
other rows.
Definition 1 (-differential privacy.) An algorithm A satisfies -differential privacy if for any
pair of neighboring databases (D,D′), and any output o ∈ range(A), the Pr(A(D) = o) ≤
exp()Pr(A(D′) = o).
Intuitively, A satisfies -DP when the distributions of its outputs are similar for any two neighboring
databases, where similarity is defined by the factor exp(). The , also known as the privacy
budget, controls the degree of the privacy offered by A, with lower values implying greater privacy
guarantees. -DP is a strong criterion, since even an intruder who has access to all of D except any
one row learns little from A(D) about the values in that unknown row when  is small.
Differential privacy has three other properties that are appealing for verification measures. Let
A1(·) and A2(·) be 1-DP and 2-DP algorithms. First, for any database D, releasing the outputs
of both A1(D) and A2(D) ensures (1 + 2)-DP. Thus, we can track the total privacy leakage from
releasing verification measures. Second, releasing the outputs of both A1(D1) and A2(D2), where
D1∩D2 = ∅, satisfies max{1, 2}-DP. Third, for any algorithm A3(·), releasing A3(A1(D)) for any
D still ensures 1-DP. Thus, post-processing the output of -DP algorithms does not incur extra
loss of privacy.
One method for ensuring -DP, which we utilize for -DP verification measures, is the Laplace
Mechanism (Dwork, 2006). For any function f : D→ Rd, let ∆(f) = max(D1,D2) ||f(D1)−f(D2)||1,
where (D1,D2) are neighboring databases. This quantity, known as the global sensitivity of f , is
the maximum L1 distance of the outputs of the function f between any two neighboring databases.
The Laplace Mechanism is LM(D) = f(D) + η, where η is a d × 1 vector of independent draws
from a Laplace distribution with density p(x | λ) = (1/(2λ)) exp(−|x|/λ), where λ = ∆(f)/.
We now present verification measures that satisfy -DP and help analysts assess the importance
of regression coefficients. We derive the measures for linear regression, as we use these models in
the analysis of wage differentials by race. To fix notation for describing the measures, let D include
all n individuals in the subset of the confidential data that is of interest for analysis. For any
individual i belonging to D, let yi ∈ R be the response variable and xi = (1, xi,1, . . . , xi,p)T ∈ Rp+1
be a set of predictors, where both are transformed as desired for regression modeling. Hence,
D = {(xi, yi)}ni=1, where all values are from the confidential data. Let E(yi | xi) = βTxi, where
β = (β0, . . . , βp)
T ∈ Rp+1.
4.1 Measures for importance of regression coefficients
In many contexts, analysts are interested in whether or not the value of some βj exceeds some
threshold, say γ0. For example, users of the SF data (economists, policy makers, lawyers) might
consider a value of βj corresponding to 1% or larger differential in average pay to be practically
significant evidence of wage discrimination. But, they might be less concerned when βj corresponds
to a differential less than 1%. Without loss of generality, assume that we want to determine if
some βj < γ0. Corresponding to this decision, we define the parameter θ0 = I(−∞,γ0](βj), where
I(−∞,γ0](βj) is an indicator function that equals one when βj ∈ (−∞, γ0] and equals zero otherwise.
We note that the measure can be used for any interval, for example, of the form [l, u] or (u,∞].
For many regression analyses of the SF data, the confidence intervals for the relevant βj are
narrow due to large sample sizes. For these βj and most γ0, the maximum likelihood estimate
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(MLE) of βj effectively tells the analyst whether θ0 = 1 or θ0 = 0. To formalize this notion, let
βˆNj be the MLE of βj based on a sample with N individuals (where N stands for a generic sample
size). We approximate θ0 by using the pseudo-parameter,
θN =
{
1 if P [βˆNj ≤ γ0] ≥ γ1,
0 if P [βˆNj ≤ γ0] < γ1.
Here, γ1 ∈ (0, 1) reflects the degree of certainty required by the user before she decides there is
enough evidence to conclude that θ0 = 1. When βˆ
N
j is a consistent estimator of βj , we can guarantee
that limN→∞ θN = θ0.
Unfortunately, we cannot release βˆNj , nor other deterministic functions of D, directly and satisfy
-DP. Instead, we release a noisy version of the key quantity in θN , namely r = P (βˆ
N
j ≤ γ0). We
do so using the sub-sample and aggregate method (Nissim et al., 2007). We randomly split D into
M disjoint subsets, D1, . . . ,DM , of size N (with inconsequential differences when N = n/M is not
an integer), where M is selected by the user. We discuss the choice of M in Section 6. In each
Dl, where l = 1, . . . ,M , we compute the MLE bjl of βj . The (bj1, . . . , bjM ) can be treated as M
independent draws from the distribution of βˆNj , where N = n/M . Let Wl = I(−∞,γ0](bjl). Each Wl
is an independent, Bernoulli distributed random variable with parameter r. Thus, inferences for
r can be made based on S =
∑M
l=1Wl. However, we cannot release S directly and satisfy -DP;
instead, we generate a noisy version of S using the Laplace Mechanism with λ = 1/, resulting in
SR = S + η. The global sensitivity equals 1, since at most one of the partitions can switch from
zero to one (or vice versa).
The noisy SR satisfies -DP; however, interpreting it directly can be tricky. First, SR is not
guaranteed to lie in (0,M) nor even to be an integer. Second, alone SR does not provide estimates of
uncertainty about r. We therefore use a post-processing step—which has no bearing on the privacy
properties of SR—to improve interpretation. We find the posterior distribution of r conditional on
SR and using the noise distribution, which is publicly known. Using simple Markov chain Monte
Carlo techniques, we estimate the model,
SR|S ∼ Laplace(S, 1/), S | r ∼ Binomial(M, r), r ∼ Beta(1, 1). (4)
Here, we treat S as an unobserved random variable and average over it. Hence, the computations
never touch the confidential data other than through the differentially private SR.
The verification server reports back the posterior distribution of r to the analyst, who can
approximate θN for any specified γ1 simply by finding the amount of posterior mass below γ1.
Alternatively, analysts can interpret the posterior distribution for r as a crude approximation to
the Bayesian posterior probability, pi
(
βj ≤ γ0|SR
)
. For instance, if the posterior mode for r equals
0.87, we could say that the posterior probability that βj < γ0 is approximately equal to 0.87. We
caution that this latter interpretation may not be sensible for small sample sizes.
In the verification of the OPM regression analyses, we use measures that compare differences
between regression coefficients estimated with the confidential data and user-specified thresholds.
The substantive experts on our team felt that this was most appropriate for the analysis of wage
gaps. However, the measures can be used to compare synthetic and confidential data regression
coefficients. Rather than setting thresholds based on scientific or policy considerations, the user
can set thresholds based on the differences they are willing to tolerate between the synthetic and
confidential data coefficients. For example, suppose the synthetic data coefficient of interest is
-.021. Suppose that the user considers the synthetic data estimate sufficiently accurate when the
confidential data coefficient is within ±50% of the synthetic data coefficient (or some other user-
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defined tolerance interval). The user can set the threshold at (l, u) = (−.031,−.010). A reported
posterior mode of r near 1 suggests that the difference between synthetic data and observed data
coefficients is within the tolerance bound (± 50%), whereas a value near zero suggests otherwise.
For any particular analysis, the usefulness of these verification measures depends on the sample
size, the number of partitions, and the value of  allowed by the data steward. Barrientos et al.
(2018a) includes analyses of the OPM data that illustrate the performance of the verification
measures for different values of these features. We discuss some of these findings in Section 6.
4.2 Measures for longitudinal trends in regression coefficients
With longitudinal data, analysts often are interested in how the value of some βj changes over
time. For example, in the SF analysis, we want to know whether the racial wage gap is closing or
growing as the years advance. Suppose for a moment that we knew the values of βj for all years.
One simple way to characterize the trend in βj over time is to break the data into K consecutive
periods and, in each time period, find the OLS line predicting βj from year. The slopes of these
lines pasted together represent a piece-wise approximation to the trend. Of course, we do not know
the values of βj ; we must use D to learn about these slopes.
We use this idea to construct a verification measure for longitudinal trends in regression co-
efficients. Specifically, the analyst begins by selecting K periods of interest. In each period, the
analyst posits some interval for the slope and requests an -DP verification of whether the values
of βj are consistent with that posited interval. For example, the analyst might split D in K = 2
consecutive intervals, and posit that the slope of βj over the years is negative in the first period
and positive in the second period. In the wage gap analysis, this would correspond to a growing
wage gap in the first period, followed by a shrinking wage gap in the second period. The analyst
can use the synthetic data to identify the periods of interest and set the intervals for the slopes, as
we illustrate in Section 5.4. Effectively, this evaluates whether the trends in βj estimated with the
confidential data match the trends estimated with the synthetic data.
Formally, suppose that D can be divided into nonempty subsets, {Dt}t∈T , where Dt denotes all
the data points in D at year t, and T is some period of years under study. Further, suppose that for
every (yit, xit) ∈ Dt, E(yit|xit) = βTt xit, where βt = (β0t, . . . , βpt)T is the vector of coefficients at
time t. Let Tk ⊂ T be a subset of years. The analyst seeks to learn the overall trend in the values of
βjt, where t ∈ Tk, during that time. To characterize this trend, let m ({(t, βjt)}t∈Tk) be a real-valued
function that returns the slope of the OLS line passing through the points {(t, βjt)}t∈Tk . The analyst
might be interested in, for example, whether m ({(t, βjt)}t∈Tk) < 0 indicating a decreasing trend,
m ({(t, βjt)}t∈Tk) > 0 indicating an increasing trend, or more generally, m ({(t, βjt)}t∈Tk) ∈ Ck for
some interval Ck, e.g., Ck is tight around zero for a flat trend. Hence, for any interval Ck, the
analyst seeks to learn θ0 = ICk (m ({(t, βjt)}t∈Tk)), where ICk (m ({(t, βjt)}t∈Tk)) is an indicator
function that equals one when m ({(t, βjt)}t∈T ) ∈ Ck and equals zero otherwise.
Because θ0 is a binary parameter, we can use the methods in Section 4.1 to release an -DP
version of it. Here we outline the procedure; formal details are in Barrientos et al. (2018a). We
split D into M partitions of employees. In each Dtl , we compute the MLE bjtl of βjt. We let
Wl = ICk(m ({(t, bjtl)}t∈Tk) and S =
∑M
l=1Wl. Following the logic of Section 4.1, we use (4) to get
posterior inferences for r = P [m({(t, βˆNtjt )}t∈Tk) ∈ Ck], where βˆNtjt is the MLE of βjt based on a
sample with Nt individuals.
When trends over the entire T are of interest, analysts can partition T into K consecutive
periods, Tk = {tk−1, tk−1 + 1, . . . , tk}, where k = 1, . . . ,K and t0 < t1 < . . . < tK . For a given set
of intervals {Ck}Kk=1, the analyst can do the verification separately for each interval, and interpret
the set of results. Alternatively, the analyst can perform a single verification across all intervals,
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setting the parameter of interest to θ0 =
∏K
k=1 ICk (m ({(t, βjt)}t∈Tk)). Here, θ0 equals one when
m ({(t, βjt)}t∈T ) ∈ Ck for every k = 1, . . . ,K, and equals zero otherwise. For example, to examine
whether the trend of βjt is decreasing during the first 9 years and is increasing during the last 15
years, the analyst would set C1 = (−∞, 0), C2 = (0,∞), T1 = {1, . . . , 9}, and T2 = {10, . . . , 24}. If
the mode of the posterior probability for r equals 0.93, we say that the posterior probability that
βjt decreases during the first 9 years and increases over the last 15 years approximately equals 0.93.
When setting Ck to (−∞, 0) or (0,∞), i.e., simply estimating whether the slope of the values of
βj over Tk is negative or positive, the posterior modes have predictable behavior. Values are close
to one when the true slope has the sign implied by Ck and is far from zero; values are close to zero
when the true slope has opposite sign and is far from zero; and, values are close to .5 when the
true slope itself is close to zero. This last feature arises when the slopes in the partitions bounce
randomly around zero.
The analyst who requests a single verification for T spends only  of the privacy budget. How-
ever, this analyst only can tell if the whole trend over T in the confidential data matches that in the
synthetic data. In contrast, the analyst who requests K verifications, one for each Tk, spends K
of the budget. But, this analyst gets finer details of the trend. For this reason, when the privacy
budget allows, we recommend using K > 1 periods for verification, as we do in the analysis of the
racial wage gap, to which we now turn.
5 Wage Differentials in the Federal Government
We now illustrate how synthetic data, verification, and a PRDN could be used together to analyze
pay differentials by race in the federal government. Section 5.1 provides background on estimating
pay differentials. Section 5.2 introduces our general regression modeling approach for the SF data
analysis. Section 5.3 describes an overall analysis of average differences in pay across races, pooling
all years of data. Section 5.4 investigates the trends in pay differentials over time.
5.1 Prior research on pay differentials
Social scientists have spent decades measuring the race wage gap. Estimates based on data from
the Current Population Survey, the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, and the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics, among other datasets, put the unconditional black wage gap over the past
thirty years between 16% – 40%. When controlling for individual demographic and job-related
variables, such as education, age, gender, occupation, and industry, estimates put the gap between
0% – 15%, depending upon the precise dataset, controls, and statistical methods used (Altonji
and Blank, 1999; Cancio et al., 1996; Card and Lemieux, 1994; Maxwell, 1994; McCall, 2001; Neal
and Johnson, 2003; O’Neill, 1990). Estimates of the race wage gap have been declining or steady
over the past few decades (Hoover et al., 2015; Sakano, 2002). For example, Altonji and Blank
(1999) estimate that the black wage gap for full time, year-round workers, controlling for education,
experience, region, industry, and occupation remained steady at approximately 6.5% from 1979 to
1995. Other studies controlling for only age, education, and location have found the gap drop from
47% in 1940 to 18% in 2000 (Black et al., 2013).
While most research on the race wage gap has focused on private sector labor markets, there
is a steady literature measuring it in the public sector (Borjas, 1982, 1983; Kim, 2004; Charles,
2003; McCabe and Stream, 2000; Llorens et al., 2007; Lewis and Nice, 1994), and particularly in
the federal government. Lewis (1998) found that between 1976 and 1986, the conditional race wage
gap for black men declined from 21.0% to 16.7%, but for black women declined only from 29.7%
to 27.9%; for Hispanic men the move was from 17.9% to 13.0%, and for Hispanic women it was
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27.9% to 23.3%. Lewis (1998) also found that black men with educations and work experiences
comparable to those for white men encounter a wage gap of 4%. He concluded that minorities made
substantial progress in closing the wage gap between 1975 and 1995, especially at the very senior
levels of the government. More recent work on the U. S. federal government found the race wage
gap, controlling for demographic and agency characteristics, between 1988 and 2007 closed slightly
for blacks from 7.9% to 7.4%, closed for Asians from 1.5% to 0.5%, and closed for Hispanics from
4.5% to 2.8% (Government Accountability Office, 2009, 57). In the GAO report, the wage gaps
were not broken out separately by sex.
5.2 General modeling approach
Following conventions in the literature on pay disparities (Blau and Kahn, 2017), we estimate the
race wage gap using linear regression techniques with a standard set of demographic and human
capital predictors, running the same models on both the synthetic and confidential SF datasets.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of an employee’s inflation adjusted basic pay in
a given year. Basic pay is an individual’s base salary and excludes any additional pay related to
geographic location, award payments, or other monetary incentives paid out to employees. We
exclude any observations with pay values of 0 or codes indicating the record is invalid, according to
the OPM. We use all available cases (Little and Rubin, 2002) for regression modeling, as we have
no reason to think values are systematically missing. In the confidential data, race is missing for
0.06% of person-years; gender is nearly always observed; education is missing for 1.82% of person-
years; age is missing for 0.01% of person-years; occupation is missing for 0.03% of person-years;
and agency and year are never missing.
The central independent variable is the race with which individual employees identify. Prior
to 2005, employees could choose to identify with 16 categories. The largest five utilized were
American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, black, Hispanic, and white. The other,
substantially less-utilized categories were Asian Indian, Chinese, Filipino, Guamanian, Hawaiian,
Japanese, Korean, Samoan, Vietnamese, Other Asian/Pacific Islander, and Not Hispanic in Puerto
Rico. We group these categories (save the last) with the Asian or Pacific Islander category and drop
the (very small) category of Not Hispanic in Puerto Rico in accordance with government practice
given the ambiguity in this category (Springer, 2005, footnote 9). After 2005, OPM created a new
combined race and ethnicity variable that enables respondents to select both a race and a Hispanic
ethnicity. Additionally, OPM collapsed the various Asian national categories into a single Asian
category, and separated out Native Hawaiian and/or Other Pacific Islander into its own category.
To make races comparable across years, we follow OPM’s guidance and aggregate the Asian
and Native Hawaiian and/or Other Pacific Islander categories to a single Asian category that is
consistent with the aggregation for the pre-2005 data. Additionally, we code individuals that report
a Hispanic ethnicity as Hispanic and disregard their self-reported race (if they did report one). In
the regressions, we include indicator variables for four racial groups: American Indian/Alaska
Native (AI/AN), Asian, black, and Hispanic. The omitted reference category is white.
We also include other variables plausibly correlated with race and pay. These include the
employee’s age as well as its square, and years of educational attainment after high school. We
include fixed effects for the bureau in which an individual works to account for time-constant
organizational factors that may affect wages, and over 800 indicators for individuals’ occupations
to account for differences in pay structures across occupations. This is the most disaggregated
occupational measure available.
Previous research on the racial wage gap in the federal government has found substantial dif-
ferences between male and female employees (e.g. Lewis, 1998). We therefore perform analyses
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Males’ Regression Females’ Regression
Variable Synthetic rˆ Confidential Synthetic rˆ Confidential
AI/AN -.006 (4) .76 -.019 (12) -.009 (7) .97 -.027 (19)
Asian -.028 (30) .99 -.040 (43) -.011 (13) .42 -.010 (11)
Black -.021 (39) .99 -.036 (61) .00013 (.3) .003 -.003 (8)
Hispanic -.014 (22) .99 -.029 (42) -.013 (19) .99 -.021 (30)
Age .033 (365) .043 (480) .023 (286) .032 (404)
Age Sq. -.00027 (269) -.00036 (352) -.00019 (205) -.00027 (295)
Education .013 (122) .021 (180) .014 (130) .023 (198)
Employee-years 13,008,298 12,720,500 12,263,514 11,874,048
Employees 1,446,499 1,430,238 1,390,611 1,348,381
Table 2: Coefficients from overall regression models and posterior modes rˆ of verification measures.
AI/AN stands for American Indian and Alaska Native, and Asian includes individuals that identify
as Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. Disparities
in sample sizes arise from deletions of cases with missing values in the confidential data analyses.
separately by gender.
There is some question as to how general the occupational information included in regression
analyses of pay disparities should be. On the one hand, if individuals are systematically excluded
from different occupations on the basis of race, because of discrimination or some other factor, for
instance, then including information on that occupation may lead to a biased estimate of racial pay
disparities. However, at the same time, there are important differences across occupations in terms
of pay structures and career advancement for which analysts would like to control (Bolton and
de Figueiredo, 2017). Here, we report results conditional on occupation; Barrientos et al. (2018a)
include results that condition only on six broad occupation classifications.
5.3 Overall differentials
In the overall analysis, each observation is an employee-year. Most individuals are observed for
multiple years, so these observations are not independent. We therefore use robust standard errors
that account for clustering at the employee level (Cameron and Miller, 2015). We also include
indicators for the year in which the observation occurs, thereby accounting for year-level shocks to
wages that are experienced by all employees.
Mimicking the way analysts would use the integrated system, we start by estimating separate
models for male and female employees using the synthetic data. The results in Table 2 reveal
important relationships between race and pay in the federal government. In particular, according
to the synthetic data results, men who identify as AI/AN, Asian, black, and Hispanic are paid
significantly less than comparable white male employees. The same holds for women of all race
categories except black, where the effect is not distinguishable from zero in terms of both practical
or statistical significance. Male (female) employees that identify as AI/AN earn approximately
0.6% (0.9%) less than similarly situated white male (female) employees. The gaps for Asian and
black male employees relative to white male employees appear to be significantly larger at 2.8%
and 2.1% percent, respectively. These gaps are noticeably smaller for women of these two race
categories, even non-existent for black female employees. Hispanic men and women take home
about 1.4% less than comparable white employees.
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The analyst next would submit requests for verification of these results. For each race coefficient
in Table 2, we make a separate verification query using the method in (4) with  = 1. We group
employees into m = 50 partitions, so that each employee is a member of only one partition. Thus,
in the language of -DP, the neighboring databases differ in one employee, as opposed to one
employee-year observation. The former is more sensible for verifications of the overall regression.
A data snooper with knowledge of all but one employee-year observation could figure out many, if
not all, of the values for the missing observation by logical deduction, e.g., easily inferring the age
of the missing year and bounding the salary between the previous and successive years. We set the
threshold γ0 = −.01, and target queries at whether βj < −.01 or not.
As evident in Table 2, the posterior modes of the verification measure clearly indicate that the
wage gaps for male employees who are black, Asian, and Hispanic are all at least 1%. The evidence
of at least a 1% wage gap for AI/AN men is less obvious but still suggestive, with a posterior mode
around .75. Thus, the verification measures validate the findings from the synthetic data regressions
of substantial racial wage gaps for black male, Asian male, and Hispanic male employees, and they
suggest the synthetic data results for AI/AN male employees are close to accurate as -.006 is not far
from -0.01. For women, the posterior models of the verification measure clearly indicate at least 1%
wage gaps for Hispanic and AI/AN employees. They also provide strong evidence against a wage
gap of at least 1% for female black employees, with a posterior mode near zero. For female Asian
employees the verification measure suggests the wage gap could be almost equally likely above or
below 1%, as the posterior mode equals .42. This suggests that the true coefficient is likely near
-0.01. Thus, the verification measures validate the findings from the synthetic data that the wage
gap for Hispanic female employees is at least 1%, but that there is not a substantial wage gap
for black female employees. They also suggest that the estimate for AI/AN (-.009) could be an
underestimate, since the verification measures suggest that the true coefficient is indeed less than
-.01. Finally, they suggest that the synthetic data coefficient for female Asian employees is likely
accurate, since it is close to -.01.
We expect that some users might be satisfied with this level of verification, and thus can publish
the synthetic data results plus the verification answers. However, others may want to perform the
analysis on the confidential data via the remote access component of the system. As shown in
Table 2, in the confidential data regression the estimated coefficients for all four race indicators are
negative and statistically significant for both genders, suggesting that non-white employees earn less
than white employees. The estimated gaps for men are at least 1.9% across races, with particularly
large gaps for black men (3.6%) and Asian men (4.0%). For women, AI/AN, Asian, and Hispanic
employees earn 2.7%, 1.0%, and 2.1% less than comparable white female workers. Strikingly, the
coefficient estimate for black women is essentially zero, suggesting parity with similarly situated
white women. The wage gaps for black women and Asian women are substantially smaller than for
men of those race categories.
The effect sizes from the confidential data are fairly similar to those from the synthetic data.
This is in accord with the conclusions from the verification measure. The most practically relevant
difference in the synthetic and confidential data results exists for employees that identify as AI/AN:
the synthetic data show gaps of less than 1% whereas the confidential data show gaps of at least
1.9%. This group of employees is the smallest racial group in the federal government, making it
challenging to create accurate synthetic data for them.
5.4 Year-by-year results
We next turn to year-by-year estimates of pay gaps in order to examine potential trends over time.
We estimate the same models used in Table 2, except run on each year of data separately. As
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Figure 1: Estimated racial wage gaps (coefficients of race indicators) for yearly males’ regressions
in synthetic data (left) and confidential, authentic data (right).
before, we start with the synthetic data. The synthetic data results in Figure 1 suggest that the
wage gap for men has shrunk steadily over the period of the study in all race groups but black
males. For black males, the estimated gap appears to be relatively stable throughout the time
period. By 2011 in the synthetic data, the wage gap appears to have disappeared for AI/AN and
Hispanic men, and reduced to around -1% for Asian men.
For female employees, the story from the synthetic data is more complicated. Figure 2 suggests
that AI/AN, Asian, and Hispanic women all had declining wages relative to white women until the
early 2000s, when the trend largely reversed, with all three groups making progress toward parity.
Indeed, the synthetic results indicate that AI/AN women actually earned more than comparable
white women after 2006. For black women, the synthetic data estimates of the wage gap change
only slightly, from 0.1% in 1988 to -0.2% in 2011, suggesting negligible wage gaps at any time point
in time during the study.
To verify these trends, we estimate the longitudinal measure described in Section 4.2. Looking
at Figure 1 for male employees, analysts might consider two sets of time periods {Tk}. The first
is an overall trend, setting K = 1 and T1 = T for all races. The second uses K = 2 periods, with
a bifurcation at a year where the pattern deviates most noticeably. These are the years 2003 for
AI/AN men, 2002 for Asian men, 1998 for black men, and 1997 for Hispanic men. We do the
same for female employees, using Figure 2 to identify bifurcations at 1998 for AI/AN women, and
at 2000 for all other female employees. We set each Ck to indicate whether the slope is positive
(Ck = [0,∞]) or negative (Ck = [−∞, 0]). Of course, one could examine other time periods and
intervals. For each verification, we use  = 1 and M = 50 partitions, ensuring that each employee
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Figure 2: Estimated racial wage gaps (coefficients of race indicators) for yearly females’ regressions
in synthetic data (left) and confidential, authentic data (right).
appears only once in each partition.
Table 3 displays the posterior modes of the verification measures for the two sets of periods.
For men, the posterior modes are all at least 0.7 for all time periods and all races, with most
above 0.9. This indicates that the trends in the synthetic data coefficients accord well with the
trends in the confidential data regressions for these two sets of periods. For women, however, the
verification results give reason to doubt some of the trends in the synthetic data regressions. For
AI/AN women, we see strong agreement in the overall trend over all years and the trend from
1998 onward, but some uncertainty about the trend between 1988 and 1998. Verification values
around .50 are consistent with a nearly flat trend in the confidential data coefficients, which is
also the trend in the synthetic data. For Asian women, we see strong agreement in the synthetic
and confidential regression trends over 2000 to 2011, modest agreement from 1988 to 2000, and
poor agreement over the whole period. The synthetic data trend suggests the wage gap for Asian
women in 2011 is nearly the same value as in 1988; however, the verification measures suggest
that is not the case. For black women, the verification results confirm that the wage gap increased
over the 24 years as a whole, and in particular between 1988 and 2000. However, the trend in the
synthetic data coefficients—which suggests black women actually caught up to white women—is
not accurate. With a posterior mean of .14, we clearly should not trust the trend for black women
in the synthetic data after 2000. For Hispanic women, we see strong agreement in the synthetic
and confidential regression trends after 2000, and modest agreement from 1988 to 2000. Between
1988 and 2011, however, the verification measure is close to 0.5, suggesting that the trend line from
the confidential data is nearly flat for Hispanic women.
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Males Females
Coefficient Interval rˆ Interval rˆ
AI/AN 1988 - 2011 .94 1988 - 2011 .94
1988 - 2003 .82 1988 - 1998 .60
2003 - 2011 .91 1998 - 2011 .98
Asian 1988 - 2011 .99 1988 - 2011 .33
1988 - 2002 .89 1988 - 2000 .72
2002 - 2011 .96 2000 - 2011 .98
Black 1988 - 2011 .89 1988 - 2011 .99
1988 - 1998 .74 1988 - 2000 .98
1998 - 2011 .71 2000 - 2011 .14
Hispanic 1988 - 2011 .99 1988 - 2011 .55
1988 - 1997 .85 1988 - 2000 .74
1997 - 2011 .99 2000 - 2011 .97
Table 3: Posterior modes rˆ of verification measures for year-by-year trends. AI/AN stands for
American Indian and Alaska Native, and Asian includes individuals that identify as Native Hawaiian
or Pacific Islander.
Turning to the results on the confidential data, Figures 1 and 2 show that the race wage gap has
been shrinking for all groups except black female employees. In the confidential data, we estimate
a significant decline in the position of black women relative to white women in the federal service
during the time period of our study. In 1988, we estimate that black women earned 0.3% more
than similar white counterparts. By 2011, black women were earning approximately 1.4% less than
white women with similar demographics and occupations.
The trends observed in the synthetic dataset are largely mirrored in the confidential data,
with the exception of black female employees. This was apparent in the verification measures, as
well, which highlighted the mismatch in the trends for black women after 2000. In both analyses,
however, it is clear that black women have not experienced the gains that women identifying with
other races have relative to white women. In general, estimated coefficients from the synthetic data
analyses tend to be smaller in magnitude than those from the confidential data analyses. There
are some sign discrepancies for the estimated coefficients as well. For instance, in the synthetic
results, Hispanic males are estimated to have higher levels of pay relative to comparable white men
in the final years of the analysis. However, the coefficient estimates from the confidential data for
Hispanic males never exceed zero.
6 Concluding Remarks
The integrated system described here enables the work flow illustrated by the OPM analysis: start
with synthetic data, verify results, and access the confidential data via a PRDN when necessary.
Although one could implement systems that exclude some of the components, integrating all three
components has advantages. We now describe some of these benefits, framing the discussion around
examples of alternative systems that exclude one or more of the components.
One possibility is not to bother releasing record-level synthetic data at all. Instead, the data
steward only allows users to query a system for disclosure-protected outputs of analyses. While in
some contexts providing only outputs may be sufficient, we believe that providing access to record-
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level synthetic data has enormous benefits. Record-level data provide readily accessible testbeds
for methodological researchers to evaluate their latest techniques. They help students and trainees,
who may not be able to gain approval to use a PRDN or other secure data enclave, learn the skills
of data analysis. Even for experienced researchers, large-scale data can be difficult to “get your
head around” because of complexities and structural subtleties that are difficult to learn without
seeing the data. Researchers often do not know in advance which are the right questions to ask
of the data or the best modeling choices for addressing those questions. As noted by Karr and
Reiter (2014), exploratory analyses dealing with the data themselves are a fruitful path to the right
questions.
Another possibility is to skip the verification step and allow for direct validation of results.
That is, allow the user to send code implementing the analysis of interest to the data holder,
who runs the code on the confidential data and returns disclosure-protected output to the user.
In fact, the Census Bureau has this system in place, offering validation of results for some of its
synthetic data products (Vilhuber et al., 2016). The disclosure protection involves ad hoc methods
like rounding estimates to a small number of significant digits and ensuring estimates are based
on some minimum number of cases. Validation as implemented currently and differentially private
verification have similar goals, but there are differences. Verification servers can provide immediate,
automated feedback on the quality of analysis results, whereas validation typically requires some
amount of manual labor on the part of the data holder, who must investigate the code and the
outputs for disclosures, decide what treatments to apply, and repeat as necessary. Done once
this checking may not be too onerous, but done repeatedly it can cost the user and the data
holder significant time, depending on the resources the data holder makes available for validation.
Additionally, with differentially private verification the data holder can track the total privacy loss
of any sequence of verification requests, which provides a provable bound on the disclosure risk
from allowing comparisons of the real and synthetic data results; this is not the case with repeated
applications of ad hoc validation methods. On the other hand, for users who want results from
the confidential data for a specific analysis regardless of what a verification would reveal, skipping
the verification step could result in fewer queries of the confidential data, which has advantages for
privacy protection.
A third possibility is to allow verification of synthetic data results but not provide users with
results from the confidential data via a PRDN or validation service. This may be fine for users
whose analyses are faithfully preserved in the synthetic data, but this is clearly inadequate for
other users. As seen with the OPM application and in other synthetic datasets (Abowd et al.,
2006; Kinney et al., 2011), inevitably synthetic data are unreliable for some analyses.
Validation is implicitly a central part of the integrated system outlined here. Outputs from
approved researchers’ analyses of the confidential data via the PRDN still should be subject to dis-
closure control treatment. Ideally, these treatments satisfy -DP, so that the system can keep track
of the total privacy budget spent on verification and validation of results. Indeed, an interesting
research topic is to optimize the usage of differentially private verification and validation for a fixed
privacy budget. Differentially private output perturbation is available for many types of analyses,
especially those based on counts (Dwork and Roth, 2014). We are not aware of differentially private
regression output perturbation techniques that scale with low error to models of the dimension and
complexity used here, i.e., a data matrix with 28 million rows and over 800 columns. Most existing
methods for differentially private regression generate only point estimates of coefficients without
standard errors; some do so under restrictions on the sample spaces of the dependent or independent
variables not relevant for the OPM data. Given the current state of the art, we suggest that data
holders use -DP methods when available and use ad hoc methods currently employed by statistical
agencies when not. This points to two other important research topics, (i) developing and testing
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the practical performance of formally private regression algorithms for large dimensional models
and data, and (ii) assessing disclosure risks inherent in coupling ad hoc disclosure treatment of
outputs with differentially private verification measures.
This last research question can be extended to the entire integrated system: how do we char-
acterize the disclosure risks inherent in releasing synthetic data like the kind we generated for the
OPM data, coupled with -DP verification or validation measures, and ad hoc validation measures
when needed? We do not have a general answer to this question, as it presents difficult conceptual
and computational challenges; this is a topic for future research. One goal to work toward is to
require all validations and all synthetic data generators to satisfy -DP, and rely on composition
properties to provide bounds on the risk. To our knowledge, this currently is not possible (at
acceptably low levels of error) with state-of-the-art techniques for generating -DP synthetic data
(e.g., Barak et al., 2007; Abowd and Vilhuber, 2008; Blum et al., 2008; Machanavajjhala et al.,
2008; Charest, 2010; Hardt et al., 2012; Mir et al., 2013; Karwa and Slavkovic, 2015) for data
with the dimensionality and complexity of the OPM data. However, work is ongoing. Because
the integrated system is inherently modular, one can substitute other techniques for synthetic data
generation, verification, and validation appropriate for the tasks at hand.
Coupling synthetic data with verification and validation services has benefits for data stewards
as well. In particular, because analysts have opportunities to verify and validate results, it is
not overly problematic if the synthetic data provide low quality answers for some analyses. This
leeway can allow data stewards to use relatively straightforward modeling strategies with automated
fitting routines, like those we used to generate the OPM synthetic data, in place of comprehensive
or computationally expensive modeling strategies. Related, it also can allow data stewards to use
synthesis routines that result in greater privacy protections at the cost of lower analytical validity.
The -DP verification measures are based on binary variables computed on sub-samples of
the confidential data. This is a generic method that can be adapted to handle comparisons for
many types of models, making it a flexible strategy for verification. However, it is not always
effective for analyses based on small samples, as documented in Barrientos et al. (2018a). In
fact, for some analyses and datasets, the partitioning process can result in inestimable regressions.
For example, the random sub-sampling may result in partitions that have perfect co-linearities or
dummy variables with all values equal to zero. Many software packages automatically drop such
variables and report coefficients for the remaining variables, making it still possible to compute
the measures although complicating interpretations of the results. When errors make it impossible
to obtain results, we suggest adapting the binary measure by adding a third category of counts
corresponding to the number of errors. Here, the outputs of the measure include the number of ones,
zeros, and errors. We can protect these counts using the Laplace Mechanism, and report posterior
modes of the number of errors and the fraction of ones among cases without errors. Barrientos
et al. (2018a) present and evaluate this variant of the algorithm. In the wage gap analyses reported
here, fitting errors did not occur due to the large sample sizes.
The choice of the number of partitions is up to the data analyst; we used M = 50 in the wage
gap verification. Analysts should strive to make M as large as possible to minimize the impact of
the Laplace noise on the verification counts. On the other hand, users should allow r to be as close
to one (or zero) as possible, as these values are easiest to interpret. Making M too large flattens
the distribution of the MLEs in the partitions, thereby moving r toward 0.5 and more uncertain
verification decisions. We found that M = 50 gave a satisfactory trade off for the analyses presented
in Section 5. We recommend that analysts experiment with the synthetic data to find a suitable
M for their analysis of interest. Another possibility is to spend some of the privacy budget on
selecting an optimal M from a discrete set of choices, according to some loss function that depends
on M and r. Developing such measures is an area for future research.
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Using the verification server, or any differentially private data release strategy, requires the
data steward to set privacy budgets. Abowd and Schmutte (2017) describe the data steward’s
task of setting  as balancing trade offs in the amount of privacy protection and degree of data
usefulness desired by society for the data product at hand. They use survey data to assess people’s
preferences for privacy and a loss function on the accuracy of estimates (of an income distribution)
to express data usefulness. To date, however, there have been few examples of differentially private
data releases in genuine production settings, and hence few practical guidelines for setting . The
Census Bureau releases differentially private synthetic data showing maps of the street blocks
where people live and work based on  ≈ 9 (Machanavajjhala et al., 2008). The data are released
once every year, and a new privacy budget (of about 9) is used for each release. Google Chrome
uses a differentially private algorithm called RAPPOR (Elringsson et al., 2014) to collect sensitive
browser characteristics from users continuously (every day). They use a per-day  = log(3). Recent
work (Tang et al., 2017) has analyzed the algorithms used by Apple MacOS Sierra (Version 10.12)
to collect sensitive user data that have been claimed to satisfy differential privacy. Through a
combination of experiments, as well as static and dynamic code analysis, this work estimates the
privacy loss per each data item sent to Apple’s servers to be  = 1 or  = 2, and the overall privacy
loss to be around 16 per day.
Regardless of the choice of , if the data steward follows -DP strictly, at some point the total
privacy budget allowed will be exhausted, at which point no new analysis results may be released.
With a finite privacy budget, data stewards have to decide who gets access to the system and in
what order. These raise complicated issues of fairness and evaluation of the importance of analyses,
which have yet to be addressed in production settings with interactive query systems. The privacy
budget used by a sequence of verification requests is an instance of a more general problem of
optimizing the privacy loss of a sequence of queries over the database (e.g., Hardt and Rothblum,
2010; Ullman, 2015). However, existing work only considers optimizing the privacy budget for a
sequence of a special class of aggregation queries called linear queries (e.g., counts and histograms).
Optimizing the privacy budget for an adaptively chosen sequence of complex tasks (e.g., regression
or verification) is an open research problem.
For integrated systems that utilize -DP, it seems likely that any reasonable overall privacy
budget will be exhausted quicker than desired. We see two general paths to addressing this dilemma.
One is technological: it should be possible to develop verification measures that use less of the
privacy budget. For example, our verification measures operate independently on coefficients, but
there may be ways to leverage correlation among the coefficients to do multivariate verification.
For specific analyses and verification tasks, it may be fruitful to work directly with the coefficients
rather than through methods based on sub-sampling.
Another approach is policy-oriented: data stewards can give up some of the global protection
from differential privacy to enhance access. For example, rather than enforce an overall privacy
budget over all queries of the data, the data steward can provide individual, approved users with
a finite privacy budget. In this case, the data steward trusts users not to collude with each other
to circumvent the protection offered by the formal privacy. This type of policy is common in
other privacy preserving data analyses, such as secure multi-party computation (Karr et al., 2007)
Alternatively, and the approach implicitly taken in our illustrative application of synthesis plus
verification, the data steward can allocate a privacy budget per analysis. In this case, the data
steward trusts individual users not to attempt to learn sensitive information from repeated queries.
With these compromises, the data steward can control the information leakage from providing
verifications for any individual user or analysis, while still offering the convenience and usefulness
of automated verification. When coupled with penalties for malfeasance and other policies, the
data steward might consider either compromise reasonable, as legitimate researchers generally are
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interested in scientific inference rather than attacking privacy protections.
Finally, we are developing a verification server and associated R package that implements the
verification measures from Section 4. This system allows analysts to run verification measures on
synthetic data, so that they can assess the likely usefulness of the measures for their analysis of
interest, as well as select effective values of M . The package also offers methods for generating
-DP plots of residuals versus predicted values, thereby helping users assess the reasonableness of
the assumptions of a posited model when applied on the confidential data (Chen et al., 2016). The
codebase for the verification measures, as well as code used to generate the synthetic OPM data,
are available in Barrientos et al. (2018c). We intend to make the package available on CRAN, so
that data stewards and other researchers can experiment with and further develop this framework
for providing access to confidential social science data.
Supplementary Material
Supplement A to Providing Access to Confidential Research Data Through Synthesis
and Verification: An Application to Data on Employees of the U.S. Federal Govern-
ment (DOI: ; .pdf). This document provides supporting material for aspects of the OPM synthesis
plus verification application. In Section 1, we provide a formal description of the three sub-models
used to model the employee’s career. In Section 2, we discuss the modeling strategies used to syn-
thesize variables in the OPM data. In Section 3, we provide the full list of the synthesized variables
along with a brief description of each of them. In Section 4, we present the analyses of wage gaps
conditional on six broad categories of occupation rather than the 803 used in the main text. In
Section 5, we describe a method for empirical disclosure risk assessment for OPM synthetic data.
In Section 6, we formally describe the verification measures for longitudinal trends in regression
coefficients. In Section 7, we examine the performance of the -differentially private verification
measures used in the text, and we present a verification measure that is suitable for analyses where
some regression coefficients are nonestimable
Supplement B to Providing Access to Confidential Research Data Through Syn-
thesis and Verification: An Application to Data on Employees of the U.S. Federal
Government (DOI: ; .pdf). This document provides graphical analyses comparing the OPM
synthetic and confidential data used in the main text.
Supplement C to Providing Access to Confidential Research Data Through Syn-
thesis and Verification: An Application to Data on Employees of the U.S. Federal
Government (DOI: ; .zip). This file contains the code used to generate the synthetic OPM data
and compute the verification measures proposed in the main text.
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